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Pension Payouts in Chile:
Past, Present, and Future Prospects
Olivia S. Mitchell and Jose Ruiz

Chile’s funded individual-account defined-contribution pension system was adopted in
1981 and is still vibrant after more than 25 years. Following in Chile’s scheme footsteps, several
other Latin American nations also adopted funded personal accounts, and countries in other
continents have also viewed the Chilean approach with significant interest. During the Chilean
system’s first two decades, analysts and policymakers devoted most of their attention to
questions pertaining to coverage, contributions, and investment portfolios. Now however, as the
system moves toward maturity and retirees are increasingly claiming benefits under the program,
there is substantial interest in how benefits will be paid. The goal of this paper is to review recent
developments in the payout market for Chilean pensions, focusing particularly on the role of
annuities, and to discuss what makes the payout market in Chile so different from those in other
nations.
In what follows, we first offer a brief summary of the Chilean defined contribution (DC)
pension system as it has evolved over the years since 1981. Next we focus particularly on ways
that participants can elect to take their pension benefits, alternatives that include both a phased
withdrawal option, and a life annuity. Last, we offer some thoughts on the nature of the Chilean
annuity market and discuss prospects for the future.
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I. A Brief Overview of the Chilean Defined Contribution Pension System1
Chile first instituted a government-run old-age system in the 1920s, and during the mid1950s, there were three main pension funds organized on occupational lines: one covered most
salaried workers, another covered the police, and a third applied to members of the armed forces.
Additional occupational systems were then added, and by the end of the 1970s, the retirement
system included a patchwork of more than 150 individual and quite fragmented defined benefit
regimes. This structure produced incomplete coverage (generally attributed to evasion of
contributions), low and uneven benefits, and ultimately led to massive financing problems. By
the end of the 1970’s, government subsidies worth 2% of GDP were needed to finance the
system, and prospects were for additional problems.
When Pinochet’s military government determined to overhaul the system, it first raised
retirement ages, boosted contribution rates, and eliminated some special schemes. Thereafter, in
1980, the new pension system was created and the old systems were closed in 1983 to new
workers who then were required to contribute to a funded defined-contribution individual
account program. Next, it instituted a mandatory national defined pension program.
The new system was very much in keeping with World Bank recommendations for a
multipillar arrangement. The first pillar program included a noncontributory, publicly financed,
means-tested, PAYGO welfare-based pension (pensiones asistenciales, or PASIS) for the
indigent. There was also a state-guaranteed minimum pension guarantee (MPG) for those

1

This section draws on Arenas et al. (2006) which cites numerous historical references to the
development and growth of the Chilean pensions system over the last three decades.
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workers who contributed 20 years into the new DC program but ended up with benefits below
the government-decreed minimum.2
The second pillar of the Chilean pension system is the better-known feature of the
system. It consists of a national contributory defined-contribution program known as the AFP
program, mandatory for wage and salary workers; affiliation remains optional for the selfemployed.3 All covered workers must elect one of the privately-managed pension funds, and
contribute 10% of their monthly earnings to that retirement fund, along with an additional
contribution (2-3 % of monthly wages) to cover administrative costs as well as disability and
survivor insurance.4 Workers can switch between AFPs with advance notice but must hold all of
their balance with a single AFP at any given time. At the outset only government bonds were
available for the investment portfolios, and more recently the AFPs have been permitted to offer
five funds in the target maturity date spirit. This approach automatically moves workers’ assets
into more conservative investments as they grow older.
There is also a small third pillar in the Chilean system, which also follows the individual
funded DC approach. In essence, any worker electing to contribute more than the mandated 10%
amount to his AFP may do so, thus obtaining some additional tax benefits. Relatively few people
add additional voluntary contributions in practice.
Figures 1 and 2 reveal time trends in the size of assets under management in the Chilean
AFP system, along with the number of contributors and retirees. Figure 3 shows the number of

2

The public defined-benefit system that administers the old PAYGO defined-benefit program
was closed to new entrants by the 1980 reform, but it continues to pay those retirees who
remained in the old program at the time of the reform; it also pays “recognition bonds” at
retirement to those who moved to the new system and received credit for prior contributions.
3
It also provides life insurance and disability benefits as part of the mandatory program.
4
Mandatory system contributions are capped at a ceiling earnings level of approximately
US$2,000 a month; fewer than 5 per cent of AFP contributors earn over that ceiling.
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people by age claiming different types of pension benefits. We observe that the asset base has
been increasing at a rate of over 9% per year, such that the pension system now amounts to more
than 60% of the Chilean GDP. The number of pensioners in the system is around 640,000, of
which 37% are early retirees, 28% are normal retirees, and 35% are disability retirees (the latter
number is relatively high inasmuch as any young system will tend to have a high proportion of
disabled participants relative to regular retirees during the early years).
Figures 1-3 here

II. Payout Methods Under the Chilean System
At retirement, retirees may use their accumulated funds to determine their retirement
payout streams. Women may begin their “normal” payouts at age 60, while men must wait until
age 65; under certain circumstances to be explained below, a worker may elect to begin his or
her payments as young as age 55 if the individual is entitled to receive “early” payments. Unlike
in some countries, receiving one’s pension does not require one to completely withdraw from the
labor force, so some workers remain employed while collecting their pension.
The main options for retirement payouts from the AFP system are either (a) a “phased
withdrawal” (PW) benefit, or (b) a life annuity payout.5
Phased Withdrawal Payments. In the case of the phased withdrawal approach, the retiree leaves
his assets invested with the AFP whereupon the fund administrator sets the payout according to a
government formula that converts the balance into a monthly payout that takes into account the

5

Strictly speaking, they have other two choices from the combination of these modalities
according to recent changes in the regulation. But in practice, few people make these
combinations.
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retiree’s age, sex, and marital status. Specifically the PW benefit paid to retiree i in year t is
given by:
PWi ,t 

Balancei ,t
12  NCU i ,t

(1)

where PWi ,t is the monthly benefit under the PW system which depends on Balancei ,t or the
amount he accumulated in the fund as of his retirement date, and NCU i ,t refers to the
government’s estimate of the “necessary capital” required to finance one unit of pension payout,
given the retiree’s sex, age, and family composition.6 The NCU term therefore this is an annuity
factor converting the worker’s accumulated pension balance into a periodic payment.
Survivorship pensions are required by law. If the pensioner is male, his widow will
receive 60% of his pension if she has no children eligible for survivorship benefits. If the
decedent leaves dependent children, his widow will receive 50% of her deceased husband’s
pension while each child receives an additional 15% of the benefit. If the pensioner is female, a
survivorship pension is paid only to her dependent children and to her surviving husband only if
he is disabled.7
When the AFP payouts first started, the government lacked good information about how
workers’ survival patterns in retirement. As a result, US actuarial tables were initially used for
annuitants to project the phased withdrawal amounts. But because those with very low balances
were not required to purchase annuities, using annuitant tables to compute payouts for those
taking phased withdrawals probably overstates their life expectancy. Over the years, new
mortality tables for Chile (RV-2004) were devised based on actual annuitant mortality patterns
for the period 1995 to 2003. And finally, each retiree’s PW amount is recomputed each year,
6
7

See Pino (2005).
The law has changed as of 2008 making survivor payments sex-blind.
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given updated mortality patterns and life years remaining, both of which produce a decreasing
pattern of payouts over time.8
As with all phased withdrawal programs, the retiree who elects the PW option retains
ownership of his AFP balance as long as it is positive, but he faces both investment risk and
longevity risk in that the asset balance might decline to zero. At the point of converting to the
PW mode, the retiree also is charged a flat fee as a percentage of the payout amount.9 In 2007,
the average PW payment for a retiree claiming at the normal retirement age was US$211 and
US$476 for the early retiree.10
Annuities. Alternatively, a retiree may use the balance in his account to purchase a life annuity
from a life insurance company. The advantage of annuitizing one’s retirement wealth is that it
then protects the retiree against both mortality risk and capital market risk, but the downside is
that the worker must relinquish the pension accumulation to the insurer. In principle, retirees can
opt for both PW and annuity payments, but most retirees actually elect either the immediate
annuity or the PW, perhaps combined with a deferred annuity.
In any event, the retiree purchases an annuity benefit from a life insurance company to
which he turns over the pension accrual and pays a commission (2% of the balance or less) in
exchange for a lifelong annuity expressed in UFs (Unidad de Fomento), a standard numeraire for
inflation-indexed payments widely used in Chile.11 The annuity benefit continues until the

8

This is similar to the 1/E[T] rule implemented by the US Internal Revenue Service, when
determining how quickly the retiree must spend down his 401(k) plan; see Horneff et al. (2007).
9
Prior to 1987 there were commissions charged on the balances but this has now been ruled out.
10
See Superintendencia de Pensiones, http://www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=45
and economic indicators from Banco Central de Chile, http://www.bcentral.cl/estadisticaseconomicas/series-indicadores/index_p.htm. Both viewed 01/20/09).
11
As of 1/09, a UF is equal to CP$21,347, or about US$34.40 (Banco Central de Chile,
economic indicators viewed at http://www.bcentral.cl/estadisticas-economicas/seriesindicadores/index_p.htm ) .
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retiree’s death, and if there are dependents, for as long as the latter are eligible. There is, of
course, some risk that buyers may suffer from insolvency by the life insurance company
providing the life annuity. In such an eventuality, the Chilean Superintendencia de Valores is
authorized to conduct a public auction to seek to recapitalize the failed company; all participating
life insurers estimate the number of periods during which they will continue paying 100% of the
promised pension annuity amounts. The life insurer offering the longest contract period wins,
and after this, the government guarantees continued benefits up to a cap, from general revenue.12
As of 2007, the average monthly annuity payment benefit for a retiree claiming at the normal
retirement age was 11 UF (US$394) and for the early retiree, 11.3 UF (US$369).13
Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the key features that distinguish the phased
withdrawal form of benefit and the annuity modality. Clearly the PW approach affords more
liquidity but more longevity and capital market risk; the Immediate or Deferred Annuity
approach protects against outliving one’s assets, but it offers little to no bequest potential.

Table 1 here
Figure 4 provides a time trend depiction of the fraction of retirees in the system taking an
annuity versus a phased withdrawal. Of particular interest is the time path of annuitization
adoption: only a few years since the system’s inception, already one quarter of pensioners had
elected the immediate annuity option and today close to 60% of retirees take the immediate life
annuity. It is in this sense that the data show quite high levels of annuitization in Chile,

12

The formula for the benefit is
Guaranteed Pension  Max 45 UF , MPG  0.75  ( Annuity  MPG )

13

Information collected from the Superintendencia de Pensiones, “Número y monto promedio en
U.F. de las pensiones pagadas por Rentas Vitalicias en el Sistema Previsional (anuales)”
www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=45 and and monetary units were converted into
US$ using data from the Banco Central de Chile (www.bcentral.cl/estadisticaseconomicas/series-indicadores/index_p.htm).
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consistent with others’ reports on the time trends (Rocha and Thornburn 2006; Morales et al.
2008; James et al. 2008; Thorburn et al. 2007)

Figure 4 here
Figures 5A and B shows the time path of benefit streams under both the PW and the
annuity, respectively for a single male retiring at age 65 and for a female retiring at age 60 (these
figures assume the male retiree has a balance of CP$20 million or approximately US$33,230; the
female balance is CP$56 million or approximately US$90,540). The projected PW amount is
initially higher than the annuity value, but within a decade after retirement, the phased
withdrawal benefit is projected to fall below the annuity payment.

Figures 5 A and B here
The Role of the Minimum Pension Guarantee. Several aspects of the Chilean retirement system
are geared to make the system pay ‘adequate’ benefits. One benchmark against which benefits
are valued is the “minimum pension guarantee” (MPG), which is set by the government as a
target minimum monthly nominal income value. This amount is inflation-updated annually and
is higher for older retirees. For instance the MPG value in December 200714 for a retiree
younger than age 70 was CP$96,391 per month (~US$174 ); for those age 70-74 it was
CP$105,396 (US$191); and for people age 75 + it was CP$112,454 (US$204). A time series of
the MPG pattern over time appears in Figure 6, where it can be seen that it was usually higher
than the national minimum monthly earnings level; as a rule it has been equivalent to about onefourth of the national average pay of contributors into the pension system.15

Figure 6 here

14

In January 2009, US$1 =CP$620.
Superintendencia de Pensiones, www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=44, Cotizantes
e ingreso imponible promedio (mensuales), viewed 1/20/09.
15
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In terms of the payout choices, the worker retiring at the normal age who takes a phased
withdrawal may receive a benefit set by the formula in equation (1), but if this benefit is below
the MPG, he can request a higher payout rate which will naturally reduce his balance more
quickly. In the event that he runs out of money, the government would top up his benefit to the
MPG amount only if the worker had contributed a minimum of 20 years into the system and his
total old-age income falls below the MPG.16 As Arenas et al. (2006) show, however, this is a
relatively stringent criterion. In fact, many retirees who were credited for service under the old
PAYGO system could have had sufficient years of service, but it has been estimated that no
more than half of future retirees will be likely to attain this 20 years of service goal.17 If the
phased withdrawal were taken at the early retirement age, then the benefit would amount to at
least 50% of his average salary in the last 10 years he paid into the system or 110% of the MPG
(rising to 70% and 150%, respectively, by 2010).
If the worker annuitizes at the normal retirement age, he must allocate at least enough of
his balance to a fixed real annuity such that his benefit is at least equal to the MPG. If he retires

early, he must purchase an annuity that exceeds 50% of his average salary in the last 10 years he
paid into the system or 110% of the MPG (rising to 70% and 150%, respectively, by 2010).
Annuity benefits may be either fixed or variable; in practice, most pay a real fixed payment
(expressed in UF) though the variable benefits has some portion devoted to a fixed real benefit
with another portion linked to some index (such as a money market or stock index); in the latter
case the fixed part must amount to at least a fraction of the worker’s preretirement pay.
16

Superintendencia de Pensiones, http://www.safp.cl/573/printer-3022.html.
Since the calculation takes into account one’s final 10 years of contributions, this means that
benefits are low for people claiming benefits after a long unemployment period or with many
zero contribution periods. To disincentivize early retirement, the regulator has limited to 16 the
number of zero months of contributions that can be counted in the retiree’s final decade of
contributions.
17
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It is also worth nothing that the government guarantee covers all of the MPG plus 75% of
the excess of the annuity value over the MPG, with a maximum payment of 45 UF. The latter
means people receiving a pension higher than MPG face insolvency risk from the life insurance
company. The higher the pension amount, the higher is the eventual benefit reduction in case of
insolvency. For this reason, people are provided not only annuity bids but company performance
information when they decide how to take their retirement benefits.
Since the new system started, there has been only one life insurer bankruptcy in Chile. At
that time, the regulator undertook provisional intervention until the beneficiaries were assigned
to another life insurance company. The regulator ran an initial auction in March of 2006 but it
was re-done as only one offer was received; the second auction in October of 2006 received two
bids. In the tender Euroamerica S.A offered to continue to pay the full pension value for 124
months,18

for US$77 million in equity.

After that period, participants will receive the

guaranteed amount from the government.

Benefit Takeup Patterns. It is of interest to explore benefit takeup patterns over time. Figure 7
shows the time path of people purchasing annuities versus taking the PW: in the 1990’s, the
number of people who elected the annuity began to rise, and it exceeded the number selecting
PW benefits. Figure 8 shows average payments that people received according to the payment
method they elected. These trends show no important difference between the average payments
for people who purchased an annuity at either the normal retirement (NR) or early retirement
(ER) age. There is, however, a significant difference between those who elect the PW at the
normal age (PWNR) and people who select the PW at the early retirement age (PWER). That is,
the average early PW amount actually paid may exceed the normal PW value, inasmuch as those

18

From February 2008 to May 2018.

11

who retire early to start receiving pension benefits must satisfy higher balance requirements. As
a result, low income people who have not accumulated much in their pension funds have little
opportunity to take early retirement payments, as a rule. It is for this reason that the normal
retirement age PW amount will be expected to be the lowest payout, on average, and likely very
close to the MPG.

Figures 7 and 8 here

III. Understanding the Chilean Annuity Market
During the early days of the Chilean pension system and into through the 1990’s, a
substantial component of peoples’ retirement accounts was charged by intermediaries in the form
of commissions. Figure 9 depicts the time path of front loaded commissions charged by life
insurers over time, which rose to around 5% of the retiree balance in 2001. In response to this
perceived high rate of charges, policymakers began to draft a law to hold down commissions.
This discussion took a decade to bear fruit, with a draft law emerging in around 2001 and a final
law passed by the Congress in 2004. Initially, a maximum commission of 2.5% of the
individual’s balance could be charged; this was then lowered to 2% in 2008. This regulation is
generally perceived to have had an important impact in bringing down commissions, as is clear
from Figure 9.

Figure 9 here
In addition to the cap imposed on annuity commissions, this reform also established a
system for retirees to obtain anonymous bids via an on-line offer and quotation system (known
as SCOMP by its Spanish acronym). This system was introduced as an electronic competitive
market for all to obtain pension quotes. In practice, the AFPs and the life insurers receive the
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same information about each person requesting a quote, including the retiree’s age, sex, balance,
and any beneficiaries. The main goal of the system was to increase competition and enhance
transparency for consumers.
Those who request a price quote via this system and purchase an annuity can elect to do
so directly, or they may engage a life insurer, broker, or financial adviser in which case they can
pay up to 2.5 percent of their pension balance to such an intermediary. The operation of the
SCOMP system may be summarized as follows:
-

A member starts the retirement process by informing his AFP of his intention (this can be
either via an agent or over the internet). The AFP issues a “certificate” reporting the
member’s balance, and the member then requests premium quotes from his AFP, a life
insurer, or any broker licensed to work with SCOMP.

-

The affiliate may request up to three quotes for each certificate issued by the AFP.

-

The system processes and certifies the validity of the request and sends the information to
the pension benefit providers, who then submit their offers to the system.

-

These are then fed to the member and are valid for 15 days.
What is important to note is that the system is merely informative; that is, each retiree

decides his own course of action. He may select any of the offers provided, request additional
quotes, negotiate with a provider apart from the SCOMP bids (with the requirement that this
external offer cannot be lower than the benefit amount offered by this provider via the SCOMP),
or request that SCOMP carry out an auction on his behalf, in which case he must take the lowest
price offer. To date, the services of the SCOMP platform have been used for approximately
144,000 retirees, who used an average of 1.3 requests per member since its creation in August
2004 (see Tables 2 and 3). This implies that 81% of requests were accepted by the affiliate or

13

pension beneficiary. In practice, it appears that the most popular way to access SCOMP is via
brokers, who advise 38% of the purchasers. The worker’s AFP can also obtain a price quote on
the retiree’s behalf, which amounts to 3% of the market, while life insurers account for 27% of
the requests.

Tables 2-3 here
The evidence also indicates that 62% of people selected the highest benefit (best
monetary offer) provided by the bidders, and the ratio rises to 84% if we consider the highest
three monetary offers generated. Though this might be interpreted as savvy purchasing behavior,
it must be acknowledged that high benefit levels are not the only consideration. This is because
insurers differ according to their risk classification, so it is difficult to compare a high benefit
payment monetary offer from a lower ranked firm with a lower benefit and a more highlyregarded firm.
Further analysis of monetary quotes indicates that takeup rates vary according to the
channel used to access the system (Figure 10). Specifically, people who referred their decision to
brokers elected the highest payout 75% of the time; the ratio was 43% when the retiree used his
AFP for advice, and only 3% when the life insurer was consulted. This could indicate that
brokers are actually helpful in assisting people’s decisionmaking. A possible explanation for the
AFP’s poor performance as a channel is related to its lack of incentives during the retirement
phase. That is, an AFP participates actively during the worker’s accumulation phase, registering
contributions, investing, and managing the account; on the other hand they receive no
commission for giving advice about payout products. The fact that so few people obtain the
highest payout product when consulting a life insurer may be due to the fact that agents have an
incentive to capture customers once they are contacted.

14

Figure 10 here
While many have deemed the SCOMP system a success, it remains the case that buying
an annuity is not a simple task. That is, the SCOMP-generated reports may be 10 pages long with
multiple numbers and calculations about payments under different payout structures (e.g. simple
annuity, annuity with a guaranteed period, etc.). This information seems to be quite daunting for
those seeking to comparison-shop annuity products at retirement. Furthermore, recent surveys
show that people are not terribly well informed about the pension system and may lack the
financial literacy to make sensible financial choices (Arenas et al. 2007; Mitchell et al.
forthcoming). As a result, retirees are likely to continue requesting the services of intermediaries,
which in turn reduces their pension levels due to the commissions charged.
A further consideration is that it is virtually impossible for people to “learn by doing” as
most people undertake this retirement payout selection process only once in a lifetime. The
decision requires the purchaser to sign a contract in which he transfers his pension balance to a
life insurer in exchange for a cash flow until the purchaser’s death. For this reason, the Chilean
pension supervisory authority has been quite focused on enhancing information flow and
strengthening the platform for annuity bids. Suppliers also benefit from SCOMP. While onethird of retirees do request online quotes directly, thus avoiding paying fees to intermediaries,
only 12% finalize the process without paying any commissions (Reyes and Steward 2008). This
reinforces the notion that consumers lack financial knowledge for making such a momentous and
irreversible decision. It is for this reason that they seek out and pay advisers; it is for this reason
that the regulator has continued a downward pressure on commissions payable to intermediaries.

15

Are Chilean Annuities Attractive?
Prior research has noted that adverse selection is likely when retirees have the option to
annuitize (Mitchell et al. 1999; Finkelstein and Poterba 2004). This arises from an asymmetry of
information between the life insurer and the individual seeking to buy the annuity. Specifically,
the retiree may have better information about her health conditions and thus about her life
expectancy, compared to the information available to the insurer. For instance, people who
believe their mortality probability is lower than average will value offered annuities more than
someone who believed that his mortality is higher. Life insurers in Chile are not allowed to
discriminate between buyers using health tests, medical records, or familiar history – in fact, they
only permit age and sex to be used to classify purchasers. Of course, in fact, mortality patterns do
differ across segments of the population for various reasons (McCarthy and Mitchell, 2003), and
mortality patterns can also change over time as result of improvements that affect life
expectancies of one group more than another (new drugs, new vaccines, etc.). For this reason, it
is of interest to ask whether there is adverse selection in the Chilean annuity market, and if so,
how important this phenomenon might be.
One way to analyze adverse selection is to simply plot population and annuity mortality
patterns which we do in Figure 11.19 The evidence strongly suggests that the male population as
a whole does die earlier than only the subset of persons which purchases annuities in Chile,
supportive of the notion that people who expect to live longer purchase annuities that allow them
to smooth consumption and avoid the longevity risk. A companion figure indicates the effect is

19

Information collected from INE (The National Institute of Statistics - Chile) where mortality
tables are aggregated over 5-year periods and disaggregated using the methodology in Ruiz
(forthcoming).
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even stronger for women. Thus there is some degree of adverse selection in the Chilean annuity
market since people who are expected to live longer are more likely to purchase annuities.

Figure 11 here
One way to quantify these differences is to compute the Actual to Expected (A/E) ratio
comparing population and annuitant mortality patterns. Specifically we compare the number of
deaths in the Chilean male population with a given age structure using one table, versus the
number of deaths in the annuitant group using the annuity mortality table. The formula is:

w q
A/ E 
w q
x

*
x

x

x

x

100

x

where q*x is the probability associated with the table in question that an individual of age x dies,
and qx is the corresponding probability for the base table. wx are the weights which are set with
value w65  100, 000 and wx  wx 1 (1  qx 1 ) . In the Chilean case, we see that the ratio for males
is 84.8 and for females, 66.1. By way of comparison, McCarthy and Mitchell (2003) find a
smaller number for US men, 65.3 but a relatively larger ratio for women, 73.6. Thus we interpret
this result as showing that men and women annuitants in Chile live longer than their country’s
population as a whole, but Chilean women live relatively much longer than their US
counterparts. As a result, it would be reasonable to conjecture that Chilean women would find
life annuities relatively more appealing than men.
Another way to judge whether Chilean annuity markets are appealing is to compute the
so-called Money’s Worth Ratio, or the discounted expected present value of the lifetime payment
stream relative to the premium, conditional on survival. This calculation requires that one
employ not just a period but a cohortized mortality table and term structure for interest rates (see
Mitchell et al. 1999). Also, the formula must take into account whether the person purchased a
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single annuity or joint annuity (compulsory for married males). In addition, in Chile, life insurers
also promise a funeral benefit of 15 UF in case of the purchaser’s death. Accordingly, the
Money’s worth ratio for a single life annuitant may be defined as:
 12( w x ) p
t x
 Ai 
 t  d 1 1  i t
t
MWRi  
P


 F



where MWR is the money’s worth ratio, A is the monthly annuity payment in UF, w is the
ultimate age in the mortality table, t px is the probability that a life aged x is still alive at time t, d
is the number of deferment months chosen in the annuity, it is the interest rate used for
discounting future payments, F is the funeral benefits and P is the premium paid to the life
insurance company.
Similarly, the money’s worth ratio for a joint annuity may be defined as:
 12( w x ) t px  0.6(1  t px ) t p y
 Ai 
t
 t  d 1
1  it 

MWRi 
P


 F



where almost all the variables are the same as before, but now we need to add the death
probability of the beneficiary ( t p y )20. In case of guarantee periods, the term t px takes the value
one in the periods covered by the guarantee.
Table 4 replicates some earlier MW computations carried out by two different research
groups at the end of the 1990s and early in the 2000’s, and Table 5 reports our own updated
estimates for the years 2005-2008. Overall, and somewhat different from other countries,21 we

20

Here we assume that the only potential beneficiary is a spouse; no children are assumed as
beneficiaries.
21
See for instance Doyle, Mitchell and Piggott (2004), James, Martinez and Iglesias (2006), and
Thorburn, Rocha and Morales (2007).
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find that MW ratios tend to exceed 1.0 in Chile and the advantage appears to be rising slightly
over time. This suggests that annuity buyers are receiving a relatively generous flow of payments
given their premium payments, which explains some of the product’s appeal. Table 6 shows the
results from an OLS regression of the MWR on several controls including the participant’s age,
balance at purchase, sex*marital status, and other factors. All variables are significant and
indicate that the Money’s Worth ratio rises with age, the size of the pension balance, and for
those who buy deferred rather than immediate products. Both single men and women fare worse
than married women, suggesting that most of the value derives from what appear to be more than
actuarially fair benefits to married women.
Tables 4-6 here
The relatively high MWRs just reported are somewhat worrisome, in that insurers selling
these products will not make a positive profit over time since in expectation they are slated to
pay out more than they earn in premiums. On the other hand we may have used an artificially
low discount rate which of course enhances the expected present value of the income flows. Thus
like other analysts, we compute the MWRs using what is conventionally deemed a “risk-free’
long-term government bond rate. If instead we were to use a higher corporate bond rate (Figure
11), the results would be to have a lower annuity payout (and also a lower PW payout as well.)
Thus the high MWRs do suggest that benefits are relatively generous under the conventional
assumptions, though it would be unlikely that these high returns would be sustainable in the long
run.
Figure 11 here
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IV. Concluding Comments

One of the most interesting features of the Chilean pension system is that approximately
two-thirds of all retirees purchase annuities, a very different result from other countries
(Finkelstein and Poterba 2004; James et al. 2006; Rocha and Thornburn 2006). In our view, this
phenomenon is attributable to several factors:
1.

High value of annuity payments. Money’s worth ratios for the Chilean pension system

are high in comparison with international experience and appear to be rising over time.
2.

Information transparency in the annuity bidding process. The transparency and ease

of the online mechanism makes it easier for retirees to find good information on annuity
premiums. In addition AFPs are now required to issue a list of people nearing retirement
age to all the pension providers, as a means to boost competition.
3.

Access to early retirement. Chilean law permits people to retire early if their pension

accrual meets certain payout thresholds. Since one need not leave the labor force in order
to receive the pension, people with sufficient accruals in their AFP accounts will value
access to the funds. Most of these retirees with substantial balances are unlikely to have
their benefits fall to the MPG threshold, so they are more likely to annuitize.
4.

Small incentives for the AFPs to promote PW. The AFP managers are mainly paid

based on affiliates’ contributions and are prohibited from paying commissions to
insurance brokers. Furthermore, AFP’s are not permitted to charge a front-end fee to
retirees who leave their money with the AFP, so agents have little incentive to encourage
phased withdrawals.22

22

All AFPs charge a fee of 1.25% on the pension balance in order to provide pension payouts.
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To date, then, the Chilean payout process appears to have been working well for retirees,
and the fact that the life annuity market is continuing to grow bodes well for future retirement
security. Nevertheless, some important policy issues remain to be resolved. One is that the
system currently uses sex-specific mortality tables to price system benefits, and women are able
to access their AFP accounts as young as age 60. These facts, combined with women’s generally
lower earnings levels, mean that women’s benefits are relatively low compared to men’s. By
contrast, in many European nations and in the US, retirement ages are the same for both men and
women, and unisex tables apply to the benefit formulas (Bertranou 2001). If a common mortality
table were used for the calculations, men’s benefits would fall and women’s would rise; if one
took the PW, men would deplete their pension balances later and females earlier. Berstein and
Tokman (2005) suggest that males’ annuities would fall by 5% while women’s would rise by the
same percentage. Raising women’s retirement age to 65 would boost their annuities by one-third
to 47%, according to Berstein and Tokman (2005)
A second issue is that until recently, poverty benefits under the first pillar were rationed.
That is, some poor retirees were unable to qualify for poverty-based old-age income support
benefits due to lack of funding for this program. As a result, risk-averse consumers would have
bought annuities to help smooth old-age consumption as long as there was some chance of not
getting welfare support. Also the MPG benefit level was set fairly low and people had to meet
strict eligibility requirements (e.g. contributing 20 years to the system) to receive this benefit.
These factors would raise the attractiveness of annuitizing instead of relying purely on the
payouts from one’s own AFP account via PWs.
Most recently, several reforms were enacted in a 2008 effort to enhance coverage and
boost first-pillar benefits (Godoy 2008). Specifically, access to the minimum benefit was made

21

easier, and the 20-year contribution requirement was dropped. Additionally, the minimum oldage benefit level was substantially increased even for those with low or no contribution histories.
These factors, combined with the impact global financial crisis, are predicted to curtail Chileans’
demand for annuitization in the future.
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Table 1. Characteristics of Alternative Payout Modes under the Chilean Retirement
System
Phased Withdrawal
(PW)

Payout Structure
Immediate Annuity
(IA)

Temporary Withdrawal (TW)+
deferred annuity (DA)

Who Controls Funds

AFP
Always
Retiree

Life Insurance co.
No
Life Insurer

AFP + Life Insurer
DA can happen earlier.
Retiree (TW) + Life Insurer (DA)

Benefit Amt.
Eligible for MPG
Bequest feasible

Variable
Yes
Yes

Constant or Variable
Yes
No

Variable + Constant
Yes
Only for TW

Attribute

Managed By:
Can Payout Be Changed?

Source: Authors’ tabulation.

Table 2: Evolution of Requests for Annuity Quotes under the SCOMP System

Year

N requesting

Average #
requests

Accepted
requests

Broker

Channel
(% of total)
Life Insurer AFP

2004
14,426
1.20
9,849
40.75
27.91
31.35
2005
33,714
1.29
28,294
36.58
25.19
38.23
2006
29,154
1.28
23,146
38.95
26.66
34.40
2007
37,606
1.36
32,524
40.20
27.79
32.01
2008*
28,992
1.24
22,386
33.92
26.49
39.60
Total
143,892
1.29
116,199
37.93
26.71
35.36
* : As of Sept. 2008
Source: Superintendencia de Valores, SCOMP, Sistema de consultas y ofertas de montos de pensión,
http://www.svs.cl/sitio/estadisticas/seguros.php.

Table 3: Annuity Quotes Accepted Based on Ranking of Benefit Offered
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008*
Ranking
Total
Best quote
66.40%
63.42%
61.96%
63.32%
59.39%
62.49%
Second best quote
15.50%
15.42%
14.15%
13.53%
14.29%
14.44%
Third best quote
7.52%
7.31%
7.37%
7.36%
7.23%
7.34%
Others
10.59%
13.85%
16.53%
15.80%
19.09%
15.74%
Total quotes
6,640
18,351
16,193
19,711
16,405
77,300
* : As of Sept. 2008
Source: Source: Superintendencia de Valores, SCOMP, Sistema de consultas y ofertas de montos de
pensión, http://www.svs.cl/sitio/estadisticas/seguros.php.
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Table 4. Previously Computed MWR’s: Chile (Risk-free rate)
James et al. 2006*
1999
2003
--1.01
0.98
0.98
--0.96
0.96
0.93
1.00
1.01
RV-98
RV-98

Male 65
Male 55
Female 60
Female 55
Joint
Mortality Table Used
*Computed for a balance of
UF1000
Source: Compiled by authors from cited sources.

Rocha and Thorburn
2006
1999
2003
1.00
1.07
0.98
1.05
1.02
1.08
0.99
1.05
1.00
1.05
RV-04
RV-04

Table 5. Updated MWR’s, Chile (Risk-free rate)

Ave. 05-08
Male, age 55

1.07

Male, age 65

1.07

Female, age 55

1.09

Female, age 65

1.11

Joint life

1.11

Source: Compiled by authors from SVS dataset.
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Figure 1: Growth of the Chilean AFP Pension System

Source: Superintendencia de Valores, Activos de los Fondos de Pensiones y Aseguradoras como
% del PIB, http://www.svs.cl/sitio/estadisticas/seg_mercado.php, viewed 1/20/09.

Figure 2: Chilean AFP System: Time Trend in Affiliates and Retirees
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Source:Superintendencia de Pensiones, Statistics for contributors and affiliates,
http://www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=41. Viewed 1/20/09.
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Figure 3: Retirees by Type
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Source: Superintendencia de AFP; Número y monto promedio en U.F. de las pensiones pagadas en el Sistema
Previsional (anuales); http://www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=45
Viewed 20/01/09
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Figure 4: Fraction of Retirees Taking an Annuity vs Phased Withdrawal (PW) or
Temporary Withdrawal (TW)
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Source: Superintendencia de AFP; “ Número y monto promedio en U.F. de las pensiones
pagadas por Retiros Programados en el Sistema Previsional (anuales)”; “Número y monto
promedio en U.F. de las pensiones pagadas por Rentas Vitalicias en el Sistema Previsional
(anuales)”; “Número y monto promedio en U.F. de las pensiones pagadas por Rentas Temporales
en el Sistema Previsional (anuales)”; “http://www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=45.”
Viewed 20/01/09
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UF

Figure 5. Phased Withdrawal and Annuity Payments Over the Life Cycle
A. For Single Male, Retire at 65 (no dependents)
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Source: Superintendencia of Pensions; Actual SCOMP quote for life annuity. Pension balance of
UF962 (~US$33,230 in ’08)

UF

Figure 4B. For Single Female, Retire at 60 (no dependents)
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Source: Superintendencia of Pensions; Actual SCOMP quote for life annuity. Pension balance of
UF2632 (~US$90,540 in ’08)
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Figure 6: Minimum Pension Guarantee Levels and Minimum Monthly Earned Income
UF
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Min. Monthly Wage
Note: MPG1 applies to those <age 70; MPG2 to ages 70-75; MPG3 for age 75+. The minimum
monthly earned income is set by the government as the lowest salary a formal sector worker may
earn. Source: Department of Statistics, Superintendencia de Pensiones.
Figure 7: Total Number of Annuities Purchased and Phased Withdrawal Benefits Elected
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Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones, www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=45.
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Figure 8: Pension Value According To Payout Method Elected
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Note: AN corresponds to the value of the annuity purchased at the Normal Retirement Age; AE
corresponds to value of the early retirement annuity; PWN refers to the value of a phased
withdrawal benefit taken at the normal retirement age; and PWE refers to the value of the phased
withdrawal taken prior to the normal age.
Source: Superintendencia of Pension Funds of Chile. Number and average amount of the annual
benefits paid, http://www.spensiones.cl/safpstats/stats/.sc.php?_cid=45.
Figure 9: Time Path of Commissions for Annuity Sales
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Source: Superintendencia de Valores, Comisiones de intermediacion de rentas vitalicias
previsionales, http://www.svs.cl/sitio/estadisticas/svtas_com_int_rvp.php.
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Figure 10: Proportion of People Electing the Lowest-Cost Annuity Quote by Access
Channel Utilized
90%
75.31%

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%

43.48%

30%
20%
10%

3.43%

0%
Jan-06

Mar-06

AFP

May-06

Jul-06

Sep-06

Nov-06

Jan-07

Mar-07

Life Insurance Company

May-07

Jul-07

Sep-07

Nov-07

Broker

Source
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Figure 11: Distribution of Age at Death of Chilean Population and Annuity Purchase
Conditional on Attaining Age 25.
A. Male

B. Female

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from RV-2004, National Institute of Statistics of
Chile (INE, 2004).

